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Dittmeier: Dittmeier: Premises Liability:

Premises Liability: The Disappearance of
the Open and Obvious Doctrine
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past, landowners were sovereign over their land, and they were
immune from liability for accidents that occurred on their land.2 One doctrine
that reflects this limited liability is the open and obvious rule, which states that
landowners have no duty of care to protect someone on their premises from an
open and obvious condition
The traditional rule has recently been modified in many jurisdictions to
disallow a landowner from asserting an open and obvious condition as a
complete defense.4 The modified version holds occupiers liable if they
reasonably could have anticipated that the invitee would encounter the danger
despite the fact that it was open and obvious.
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. is consistent with Missouri's modified rule
that an open and obvious condition is not a complete defense to a landowner's
liability if the landowner could have anticipated that the invitee would still
encounter the danger. However, the court in Smith failed to limit this rule to the
narrow application intended by the Missouri Supreme Court.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

Elizabeth Smith brought a lawsuit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for
personal injuries under a premises liability theory.6 On July 18, 1994, Elizabeth
Smith was entering Wal-Mart with her son, Andrew, when she slipped in a
puddle of water that had accumulated in the vestibule entrance.7 The puddle
resulted from Wal-Mart employees watering plants and shrubs in front of the
store. 8 The water ran across the parking lot, forcing customers to walk through
the water and then track the water inside the store. 9 Smith did not realize the

1. 967 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
3. See Ingram, infra note 26, at 241.
4. See discussion infra Part IIIB.
5. See discussion infra Part V.
6. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Her
husband, Joel Smith, also brought suit against Wal-Mart for loss of consortium in the
same action. Id.
7. Id. at 202-03. She was there to buy cleats for Andrew's football practice which
began at 6:00 p.m. The accident occurred about an hour before the practice time. Id.
8. Id. at 203.
9. Id. at 203. Andrew tried to jump over the water but did not quite make it.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 8
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
[Vol. 64

1022

floor was wet until after she fell, when her shorts and legs were wet."° Her son
helped her up, and she informed the "greeter" and assistant manager of the
accident and filled out an incident report."
Smith's back began to hurt the day of the incident.'2 The next day, July 19,
she had x-rays taken and medication prescribed by Dr. Cornett at Mercy Medical
Center. 3 She eventually saw Dr. Samson, an orthopedic surgeon, who initially
recommended that she stay off work and limit her activity, but when her
condition did not improve, he ordered a CAT scan. 4 He discovered that Smith
had a herniated disc which necessitated surgery.' s
The jury found Wal-Mart one hundred percent at fault and returned a
verdict for Smith, awarding her three hundred thousand dollars. 16 Wal-Mart
moved for a directed verdict in the trial, and the motion was denied.17 Wal-Mart
then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and again, the motion was
denied." Wal-Mart appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting
its motions. 19 Wal-Mart argued that Smith had no case because the water that
she slipped on was an "open and obvious" condition.20 According to Wal-Mart,
since an open and obvious condition presents a defense to a premises liability
claim, Wal-Mart should not have been held liable for Smith's injuries.2'
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri upheld
the verdict in favor of Smith.u It stated that an open and obvious condition does
not automatically bar recovery and release a defendant from all liability.23 The
court held that a defendant can be found liable if it should have anticipated that
harm might occur to its invitees, despite the open and obvious condition.24

Elizabeth walked on her tippy toes through the shallower parts of the stream. Id.
10. Id. There was testimony that no sunlight entered the area which could have
reflected on the floor, making the puddle noticeable. Id. at 204.

11. Id. at 203. They then bought the cleats and went to Andrew's football practice.
Id.
12. Id.

13. Id. The following day she went to Salem Hospital for more x-rays and was told
she needed to stay in bed for a week. She again visited Dr. Comett who recommended
that she see an orthopedic surgeon. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id. Dr. Samson found that Elizabeth still had pain and numbness in her leg and
pain in her back one month after the surgery. Id.
16. Id. at 202. Her husband was awarded an additional $25,000. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 203.
22. Id. at 209.
23. Id. at 204.
24. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, landowners have enjoyed a special status under the law of
negligence72 Originally, they were not held to the same standard because they

were viewed as sovereign over their land, with the right to use it as they chose.26
However, there was a conflict between the landowner's historical immunity and
normal principles of negligence.2 7 This resulted in courts compromising and
establishing three classifications of entrants on the land-trespassers, licensees,
and invitees-with the landowner owing each class a different duty of care.28
"Invitee" is the most difficult classification to define.29 One approach, the
benefit test, focuses on the economic benefit to the landowner or occupier from
the invitee's presence on the land.3" The notion is that the landowner must keep
his premises safe in exchange for the economic benefit he receives or might
receive from the invitee.31 The other approach emphasizes the invitation aspect.
The theory is that when the landowner opens his premises to the public, he is

25. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1 (2d ed. 1986).
26. "[T]he King's law stopped at the boundary of the owner's sovereign territory
except in felonies and trespass actions." Glenn Avann McCleary, The Liability of a
PossessorofLand in Missourito PersonsInjured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REV. 45,
45 (1936). This view originated in England during the time of feudalism, when the
landowning class controlled much of the law. See Lucinda S. Ingram, MissouriRetreats
From the Known or Obvious DangerRule in PremisesLiability, 54 Mo. L. REV. 241,243

(1989).
27. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 129; McCleary, supra note 26, at 45.
28. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 129. This Note's focus is on invitees;
however, it is helpful to understand the definitions of the other two classifications and
the duty of care owed to each. A trespasser is one who enters another's land without the
owner's permission, and generally, the landowner owes no duty of care to the entrant
other than to refrain from wanton and willful conduct. See HARPER ET AL., supra note
25, at 129; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965). "A licensee is a
person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's
consent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965). The landowner only owes
a duty to warn of hidden dangers about which he knows. See HARPER ET AL., supra note
25, at 129-30. However, some jurisdictions have abolished the rigid classifications and
impose on landowners a general duty of reasonable care to all entrants. See infra note
77.
29. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 61, at 420 (5th

ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER& KEETON) (stating that "an important conflict of opinion
as to the definition of an invitee, as well as to whether certain visitors are to be included
in this category"); HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 218 (recognizing that "considerable
controversy surrounds the matter").
30. This is the test that has been historically used in Missouri to define "invitee."
However, courts have sometimes used terms such as "invited" and "permitted," which
are associated with the invitation test. See Glaser v. Rothschild, 120 S.W. 1, 3 (Mo.
1909); Ingram, supra note 26, at 248; McCleary, supra note 26, at 59.
31. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, at 420.
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representing to the public that his premises are safe.32 Both tests usually result
in the same entrants being classified as invitees; however, there are certain
situations in which the results might vary.3 3 The Second Restatement of Torts
solved this problem by including both tests in its definition.34
Of all classifications, the invitee is owed the highest degree of reasonable
care.35 However, the landowner still does not owe a complete duty of care as he

is "not an insurer of the safety of the invitees. ' 36 The landowner has a duty to
exercise reasonable care in protecting invitees from dangerous conditions about
which he knows or should know, and that he does not expect the entrant will
discover or understand.37
A. The TraditionalOpen and Obvious Defense
Traditionally, if a danger is open and obvious to an invitee, the landowner
owes no duty to warn or protect the entrant. 38 This limitation on an occupier's
32. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 29, at 422.
33. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, § 27.12, at 218; Fleming James, Jr., Tort
Liabilityof OccupiersofLand: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L. REV.
605, 612 (1954). For instance, those attending free public lectures, church services, or
free public entertainment have been classified as invitees by the invitation test, but it
would be difficult to include them under the benefit test. See HARPER ET AL., supra note
25, at 228; James, supra, at 617-18. On the other hand, independent contractors or
delivery men have not necessarily been extended a public invitation, and their
classification as invitees is better explained under the benefit test. See HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 223; James, supra,at 615.
34. The Second Restatement of Torts defines an "invitee" as:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as
a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). The second subsection refers to the
invitation test, and the third subsection refers to the benefit test.
35. See HARPER ETAL., supra note 25, § 27.12, at 218.
36. See PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 29, at 425.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).
38. Until recently, it was well settled in Missouri that an open and obvious
condition served as a defense to a landowner's liability. See Bohler v. National Food
Stores, Inc., 425 S.W.2d 956, 958-59 (Mo. 1968) (finding that plaintiff knew of defective
condition of sidewalk and therefore could not recover because the danger was as well
known to her as it was to the store); Sellens v. Christman, 418 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1967)
(holding that when neighbor knew that tree was lodged high in another tree after being
cut, there was no duty on defendant to warn); Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co., 318 S.W.2d
226, 229-30 (Mo. 1958) (stating that the "principal question is whether the dangerous
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8
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liability reflects the historical aspect of a landowner's immunity regarding
accidents which occur on his premises.39 The rule also protects the possessor
from being an insurer of safety. The rule is sometimes referred to as the "open
and obvious" rule, the "no duty" doctrine, or the "traditional" or "orthodox"
rule.4" It serves to deny an invitee recovery for injuries resulting from a
dangerous condition which was known or should have been known by the
invitee.41 It originally focused on the landowner's duty and did not consider the
conduct of the invitee.42 The FirstRestatement of Torts reflected the common
law standard:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only
if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the
condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an
unreasonable risk to them, and
(b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or
realize the risk involved therein, and
(c) invites or permits them to remain upon the land without exercising
reasonable care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to
give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.43
The possessor of land, therefore, was under no duty to protect invitees from
dangerous conditions about which the invitee knew or which were so obvious
that the landowner could reasonably expect that the invitee would realize the
danger and take reasonable care for his own safety. 4 The Restatement intended

condition was known to plaintiff,or was so open and obvious that she in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known of the condition and appreciated the hazard, and for
that reason there was no duty on the defendants to warn her of it"); Howard v. Johnoff
Restaurant Co., 312 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Mo. 1958) (holding that defendant should not be
held negligent for "obviously smooth, slick, shiny surface" of a dance floor); Stafford v.
Fred Wolferman, Inc., 307 S.W.2d 468, 475-76 (Mo. 1957) (determining that jury
instruction failed to observe that defendant did not need to warn about open and obvious
dangers). For a general discussion, see David. J. Doll, The Demise of the Open and
Obvious Rule in Illinois, 16 S. ILL. U. L. J. 179, 180 (1991); Page Keeton, Personal
InjuriesResulting From Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 629, 633-34
(1952); 62 AM. JUR.2D PremisesLiability § 146 (1990).
39. See Ingram, supra note 26, at 241.
40. See Ingram, supra note 26, at 249; 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 146

(1990).
41. See Ingram, supra note 26, at 249.
42. The FirstRestatement ofTorts presents the landowner's duty to invitees. See
infra note 43.
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 343 (1934) (emphasis added).
44. See Keeton, supra note 38, at 642.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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this to be an objective test, focusing on the occupier's expectations, and not a
subjective test of whether the invitee was justified in his conduct.45
Various rationales support the open and obvious doctrine. The one most
often given, and the one that finds much support in Missouri law, is that a
landowner's liability for accidents that occur on his land is predicated on his
"superior knowledge" of the conditions on his premises. 46 It is argued that if the
invitee has knowledge equivalent to that of the occupier, then the landowner is
in no better position to protect the invitee than the invitee himself, and the invitee
should exercise reasonable care for his own safety.47 Therefore, the landowner's
duty to protect the entrant is limited. As long as the landowner does not
misrepresent the existence of dangerous conditions on his premises, he is not
liable, even if it appears that his conduct in not removing the condition is
unreasonable.48
Another argument used to justify the no duty rule is that the condition is not
unreasonably dangerous if it is obvious. 49 The probability of injury is low
because people are likely to discover the danger and protect themselves. Some
jurisdictions have held that actual knowledge serves the same purpose as a
warning,"1 while others have found that it is unfair to hold a landowner liable for
failing to foresee that an invitee would ignore an obvious danger. 2
Some courts use the rationale of other negligence defenses, such as
assumption of risk53 and contributory negligence,54 to explain the doctrine.

45. See Keeton, supra note 38, at 642-43.
46. See Cunningham v. Bellerive Hotel, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Mo. 1973);
Bohier v. National Food Stores, Inc., 425 S.W.2d 956, 958-59 (Mo. 1968); Sellens v.
Christman, 418 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1967); Doll, supra note 38, at 180; Keeton, supra note
38, at 634; 62 AM. JUR. 2D PremisesLiability § 147 (1990).
47. One commentator argues that this idea has similar characteristics to
contributory negligence, and that problem arose when many jurisdictions replaced
contributory negligence with comparative negligence. See Doll, supranote 38, at 181;
see also infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
48. See Keeton, supranote 38, at 634.
49. See James, supra note 33, at 623-25.
50. See James, supra note 33, at 623-25. "The knowledge of the condition
removes the sting of unreasonableness from any danger that lies in it, and obviousness
may be relied on to supply knowledge." James, supra note 33, at 625.
51. See, e.g., Atherton v. Hoenig's Grocery, 86 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1957);
Wagner v. Lone Star Gas Co., 346 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). However,
neither Iowa nor Texas have retained the open and obvious rule in its strict form. Iowa
modified its open and obvious rule by adopting the Second Restatement of Torts in
Hanson v. Town & CountryShopping Ctr., Inc., 144 N.W.2d 870, 874-75 (Iowa 1966),
and Texas has since abolished the rule completely, replacing it with principles of
contributory negligence. See Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex.
1978).
52. See, e.g., Webb v. Thomas, 296 P.2d 1036, 1039-40 (Colo. 1956).
53. See, e.g., Atherton, 86 N.W.2d at 254 (stating that an "invitee assumes all
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8
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However, some commentators believe that these other negligence principles only
confuse the issue and add nothing to the analysis. 5" At least one commentator
has looked at two forms of assumption of risk and how each relates to the open
and obvious doctrine. 6 Primary assumption of the risk applies when defendant
simply has no duty.57 This would reflect the original notion that a landowner
owes no duty to protect an invitee from obvious dangers.58 On the other hand,

secondary assumption of risk focuses on an invitee's decision to take the risk of
encountering the obvious danger." This is another way of applying contributory
negligence.6
Despite the fact that courts sometimes word the open and obvious defense

in terms normally reserved for contributory negligence, the two defenses can
yield different results.6 An invitee could encounter an obvious danger, and yet
his actions might still be reasonable in certain circumstances, in which case he
would not be negligent.62 Results of the two defenses could also differ
depending on whether the entrant's actions were deliberate. An invitee could
accidently encounter the danger by either slipping (without negligence) or by

normal, obvious, or ordinary risks attendant on the use of the premises"); Dixon v.
General Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo. 1956) (same). See also W. Page
Keeton, Assumption ofRisk and the Landowner,20 TEX. L. REV. 562 (1942) (discussing
generally the assumption of risk defense in premises liability cases).
54. See, e.g., Texas Co., Inc. v. Washington B. & A. Elec. R.R. Co., 127 A. 752,
754 (Md. f925) ("[T]he real underlying principle of the decisions is the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. And this contributory negligence arises from the failure of
the plaintiff to use due care to avoid dangers which he knows exist.).
55. See Ingram, supra note 26, at 250-51 (recognizing that "commentators have
expressed frustration over the confusion of courts in application of these related
theories"); James, supra note 33, at 630-31 (stating that "contributory negligence has
often played an important role, and is sometimes hopelessly confused with the duty
issue"); 62 AM. JUR. 2D § 149 (1990) (stating that "it is often difficult to determine from
the language used by the court in a particular case whether recovery was denied under
the 'no duty' rule, or on the theory of assumption of risk, or ofcontributory negligence").
56. See Doll, supra note 38, at 181-82.
57. See Doll, supra note 38, at 181-82.
58. See Doll, supra note 38, at 181-82.
59. See Doll, supra note 38, at 181-82.
60. See James, supra note 33, at 631.
61. The traditional open and obvious rule focuses on a landowner's duty, while
contributory negligence (or comparative fault) focuses on an invitee's actions. Although
the obviousness of a condition is relevant in determining an invitee's negligence, the
existence of a duty on the part of a landowner must first be found. See Doll, supra note
38, at 190.
62. See James, supra note 33, at 630 (stating that "a traveler may knowingly use
a defective sidewalk, or a tenant a defective common stairway, without being negligent
if the use was reasonable under all the circumstances").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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being pushed into the danger.63 In all of these situations, an invitee would still
be barred from recovering under the traditional open and obvious rule 4and the
FirstRestatement, despite the fact that his actions were not negligent.
Those courts which tended to use principles of contributory negligence in
applying the open and obvious rule began to have problems when their states
replaced contributory negligence with comparative fault principles. 65 For
example, for years Missouri was faced with the question of how the adoption of
comparative fault would effect the open and obvious defense in premises liability
cases. 66 The Missouri Supreme Court first encountered the problem in Cox v.
J.C. Penney Co.6' The court stated that, under common law, if an invitee failed
to act with reasonable care in discovering an obviously dangerous condition, he
was contributorily negligent and could not recover.6' The court then noted that
this was contrary to comparative fault standards because it "pretermits jury
assessment of respondent's fault for failure to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition." 69 The court stated that the adoption of comparative
fault modified the traditional common law governing the relationship between
an owner and an invitee. 70 In Harrisv. Niehaus, 71 the supreme court clarified
Cox by explicitly stating that the decision did not abolish the concept that an
open and obvious condition is a consideration in determining a landowner's
duty.72

63. See James, supra note 33, at 630.

64. See James, supranote 33, at 631. However, the invitee would probably not be
barred from recovery under the modified rule of the Second Restatement, because if the
invitee's actions were reasonable then it would be likely that the landowner could have
anticipated his actions. See infra note 79.
65. See generallyPatton v. May Dep't Stores Co., 762 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1988); Cox
v. J.C. Penney Co., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987); Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 537
N.E.2d 738 (1989). See also Doll, supra note 38, at 181; James, supra note 33, at 630.
66. See Cox, 741 S.W.2d at 28. A year later the court reaffirmed its decision. See
Patton, 762 S.W.2d at 40 (holding that comparative fault principles apply to slip and fall
cases on business premises, and an injured invitee no longer carries the burden of proving
that she did not know ofthe dangerous condition); see also Ingram supra note 26, at 241
(discussing how these two cases affected the traditional no duty rule in Missouri).
67. Cox, 741 S.W.2d at 28.
68. Id. at 29-30.
69. Id. at 30. However, Judge Donnelly argued that the adoption of comparative
fault in Gustafson did not have to change the laws governing premises liability. Id.
(Donnelly, J., dissenting).
70. Id.

71. 857 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1993).
72. Id. at 227. In fact, the court found that defendants had no duty originally, and
therefore, overruled a jury's verdict, finding Mrs. Harris 90% at fault and the trustees
only 10 % at fault. Id. at 225, 227-28.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8
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In addition to the confusion it created with other negligence defenses, the
no duty doctrine began generating criticism for conflicting with modem
principles of tort law. In 1954, Fleming James spoke out:
The Restatement [First] view is wrong in policy... For the invitee,
the occupier must make reasonable inspection and give warning of
hidden perils. Why should his duty stop at this point short of
reasonable care? ... The gist of the matter is unreasonable probability
of harm in fact. And when that is great enough in spite of full
disclosure, it is carrying the quasi-sovereignty of the landowner pretty
far to let him ignore it to the risk of life and limb.73
Courts also became dissatisfied when a negligent store owner escaped liability
for injuries which occurred on his premises to a customer who was not
negligent.74 The growing criticism of the traditional rule led to its modification
in the Second Restatement.
B. Modification of the Open and Obvious Rule
The pure open and obvious rule reflected traditional notions of immunity
for landowners. 75 However, over the last century, tort law, and especially
negligence, has gained broader application, resulting in a wider range of
liability. 76 This has had a significant effect on premises liability and the
traditional idea of landowner sovereignty.77 One of the results of this increase
in liability of landowners has been a modification of the no duty rule.

73. James, supra note 33, at 628. James also stated that "[t]he law has never freed

land ownership or possession from all restrictions or obligations imposed in the social
interest," to support his criticism of the FirstRestatement. James, supra note 33, at 628.
74. See, e.g., Williamson v. Derry Elec. Co., 196 A. 265 (N.H. 1938). Some courts
chose not to directly state that they were rejecting the traditional rule, but simply held
that when the danger was significant and could easily be remedied, the defendant should
not escape liability. See, e.g., Dean v. Safeway Stores, 300 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957);
Petera v. Railway Exch. Bldg., 42 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931). See also Ingram,
supra note 26, at 251; James, supranote 33, at 628-30; Keeton, supra note 38, at 634-35.
75. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
76. HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 132.
77. For instance, there has been movement to reform the rigid classifications of

entrants. The British Parliament abandoned the classifications in 1957, and beginning
with California in 1968, seven other states (Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island) have abolished the distinctions completely.
See HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 132-33 n.18. Other jurisdictions have combined
the classifications of invitee and licensee, and only recognize trespasser as a distinct
classification. All of these jurisdictions now apply normal negligence standards to
invitees. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 132-33; Ingram, supranote 26, at 244-46.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Many jurisdictions now hold that an open and obvious condition does not
automatically negate a landowner's duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping
his property safe.7" These jurisdictions have followed the Second Restatement
of Torts, which adopted the FirstRestatement concerning the duty owed to an

invitee,79 but then addedanother section to include:

§ 343A. KNOWN OR OBVIOUS DANGERS
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger
is known or obvious to them, unless the possessorshould anticipate
the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from
a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make
use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of
importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.8"
Courts have interpreted this to mean that the landowner may have a duty to
warn and/or protect if he anticipates that the invitee will encounter the danger
even though it is known or obvious. There are three situations when a
landowner could anticipate such an encounter: (1) when it is to the customer's
advantage to encounter the known danger; (2) when the customer could be
distracted from noticing the open and obvious danger; or (3) when the customer
could forget that he earlier discovered the danger.8'
The Second Restatement gives four illustrations of situations when a
landowner would be liable to an invitee. In the first fact pattern, a department
store has a weighing scale which sticks out into the aisle. The scale has displays

78. See, e.g., Ward v. K-Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223 (Il1.1990); Bertrand v. Alan
Ford, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. 1995); Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d 20, 25
(Miss. 1994); Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1993).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DANGEROUS CONDITIONS KNOWN TO OR
DISCOvERABLE BY POSSESSOR § 343 (1965). This Section provides that:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discoveror realize the danger,or willfail
to protectthemselves againstit, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Id. (emphasis added).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965) (emphasis added).
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965); Richard L.

Ferrell, III, Emerging Trends in Premises Liability Law: Ohio's Latest Modification
Continues to ChipAway At BedrockPrinciples,21 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1121, 1137 (1995).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8
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of products all around it, but it is still easily noticeable. 2 In the second situation,
a drug store has a platform six inches high which the customer notices when she
sits down at the stool to buy ice cream, but forgets when she leaves.83 The third
involves a grocery store that has allowed a fallen rain spout to remain on a
sidewalk used by customers leaving the store. A woman, whose arms are full
of purchases blocking her vision, does not notice the spout. 84 In the last
illustration, the landowner rents office space to an employer whose employee
has no choice but to use a slippery waxed stairway on her way to work.85 In all
of these cases, the danger was "visible and quite obvious," yet the Restatement
says the owner should be held liable. 6 Many courts that have applied the
modified version of the open and obvious rule in a particular case have faced
facts similar to those used in one of these four illustrations. 7
Missouri adopted Section 343A of the Second Restatement in Harrisv.
Niehaus.88 In Harris,three children drowned after the car in which they were
left slid down a steep slope into a lake at the bottom of the hill. 9 The parents
filed a wrongful death action against the trustees of the subdivision, arguing that
the trustees should have warned or protected the children from the dangerously
steep slope.90 The court held that the steep slope with the lake at the bottom was
an open and obvious condition as a matter of law.91
The court then addressed the conditional aspect of the open and obvious
rule in the Second Restatement. It held that the evidence, and commonsense,
supported the trustees' position that they could rely on their invitees to take
precautions in avoiding the hazardous conditions.92 The court stated that "[t]he
trustees are entitled to expect that their invitees will exercise ordinary perception,
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f, illus. 2 (1965).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f,illus. 3 (1965).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f, illus. 4(1965).
85. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f, illus. 5 (1965).
86. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f., illus. 2-5 (1965).
87. In one case, a customer ran into a five foot tall post as he left the store carrying
a mirror that obstructed his vision. He passed the post when entering the store. Ward v.
K-Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223 (1990). In another case, a woman slipped and fell on ice
in the parking lot. The court held that there was a question for the jury as to whether a
reasonable person would take the risk ofwalking on an icy parking lot "in order to enjoy
the benefit of shopping at Droege's." Hellmann v. Droege's Super Market, Inc., 943
S.W.2d 655, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
88. 857 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. 1993).
89. Id. at 224. The children's mother, who had successfully bid on a roofing job,
stopped by the subdivision to see the progress. Id.
90. Id. at 225.
91.Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 226-27. However, the dissent argued that the trustees could have
anticipated the mother's negligence, a possible mechanical malfunction in an automobile
causing it to roll down a hill, and that a parent might leave a child in a car unsupervised.
Id. at 228 (Benton, J., dissenting).
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intelligence and judgment, discover this obvious condition, appreciate the risk
'
it presented, and take the minimal steps necessary to avert a tragedy."93
The
94
court also reiterated that landowners are not insurers.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri
embraced the Second Restatement in Hellmann v. Droege's SuperMarket,Inc.95
In this case, a customer slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a grocery store's
parking lot.96 The court found that the ice was open and obvious, but that a jury
could find that the store should have anticipated that customers would still come
into contact with the danger because of the benefit of shopping at the store.97
The court distinguished Hellman from Harrisby declaring that the plaintiff's
actions in Harriswere "patently unreasonable" and that the risk of leaving
children in a car parked on an incline outweighs the benefits of doing so. 98
The Missouri Supreme Court is one of the few state courts to have adopted
the modified version of the open and obvious doctrine, while still deciding in
favor of the possessor of land.99 It apparently narrowed the application of the
doctrine, and it refused to speculate about situations that the trustees might have
been able to anticipate.' ° Other courts, however, have given the doctrine a
broad application, effectively abolishing the doctrine.' °'
For instance, in Ward v. K-Mart Corp.,10 2 the Illinois Supreme Court
broadly interpreted the Second Restatement.0 3 In Ward, the plaintiff entered KMart, passing two concrete filled metal posts about five feet tall outside the
entrance.1° He purchased a mirror at the store, and as he was leaving, he held
the mirror in front of him, blocking his vision. He ran into one of the posts

93. Id. at 226.
94. Id.
95. 943 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
96. Id. at 657.
97. Id. at 658-60.
98. Id. at 659. However, Harrisdoes not address whether the plaintiffs actions
were reasonable or unreasonable, but instead addresses whether the trustees could rely
on invitees protecting themselves. Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. 1993).
99. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. 1995); Ward v.
K-Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 1990); Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So. 2d 20 (Miss.
1994). But see Harris,857 S.W.2d at 222.
100. However, the dissent does speculate on foreseeable situations. See supranote
92.
101. See generallyDoll, supra note 38.
102. 554 N.E.2d 223 (111.
1990).
103. See Doll, supra note 38, at 192-94. However, the court's application is
consistent with the Restatement's literal meaning, considering the illustrations following
Restatement Section 343A. See supranotes 82-85 and accompanying text.
104. Ward v. K-Mart Corp., 540 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), rev'd, 554
N.E.2d 223 (Il. 1990).
105. Id. at 1037-38.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/8

12

1999]

Dittmeier: Dittmeier: Premises Liability:
PREMISES LIABILITY

1033

with the mirror and injured his eye.' 6 The court found that the store should have
anticipated that a customer might block his vision with a purchase, and therefore
not discover the dangerous condition.0 7
The general trend throughout the country is a rejection or modification of
the traditional open and obvious rule.10'8 Limiting the landowner's immunity
reflects the trend in modem negligence law of increasing liability. 109 Most
jurisdictions try to incorporate normal negligence principles in premises liability
cases in order to yield consistent results.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District of Missouri found that Wal-Mart could still be held liable even
if the water upon which'Smith slipped was an open and obvious condition. WalMart's liability hinged on the question of whether the store could have
anticipated that the risk of harm existed even though the condition was open and
obvious. °
The court first looked at general premises liability principles. It stated that
the duty owed by the landowner to a customer is "reasonable and ordinary care
in making the premises safe."'' There is a breach of this duty when the
landowner's "conduct falls below the applicable standard of care."". The
applicable standard of care is decided by the courts as a matter of law, and
whether the landowner fell below that line is a question for the jury."3
The court then turned to the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Harris
v. Niehaus," 4 in which Missouri adopted Sections 343 and 343A(1) of the
Restatement (Second)of Torts."' Section 343 sets out the applicable standard
of care for landowners." 6 Section 343A addresses those dangers which are

106. Id.
107. Ward v. K-Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 234 (Ill. 1990).
108. See Ferrell, supra note 81, at 1138 n.112; Jacqueline L. Hourigan,
Negligence-Premises Liability-Where Hazardous Condition Is of an Open and
Obvious Nature, Premises OwnerRetains Duty To Warn of UnreasonableRisk, 73 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 613, 620-22 (1996).
109. HARPERETAL., supra note 25, at 132.
110. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
111. Id. at 203 (quoting Morrison v. St. Luke's Health Corp., 929 S.W.2d 898, 903
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
112. Id. at 203-04 (quoting Hellman v. Droege's Super Market, Inc., 943 S.W.2d
655, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).
113. Id. at 204.
114. 857 S.W.2d 222, 225-26 (Mo. 1993).
115. Smith, 967 S.W.2d at 204.

116. The court summarized as follows:
[T]he possessor of land must "(1) exercise reasonable care; (2) disclose to the
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known or obvious to invitees: "[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees
for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the'possessor
shouldanticipate the
17
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.'
The court focused on this last phrase of the paragraph, and recalled its
holding in Hellman v. Droege'sSuper Market, Inc.,"' in which it stated that
finding a condition open and obvious is not the end of the inquiry." 9 The jury
must still decide if the owner of the premises should have anticipated that the
risk of harm existed despite the open and obvious danger.' The court reviewed
how it applied this concept in Hellman
to a woman who had slipped and fallen
2
on ice in the parking lot of the store.'1
The court then found that Wal-Mart should have anticipated harm to its
customers because the store knew that the water from the parking lot was being
tracked into the store's vestibule. Additionally, the store was aware that the floor
was wet and could be dangerous because another customer (an off-duty
employee) had slipped and
informed the store of the condition almost an hour
22
incident
Smith's
before
Therefore, the court held that the jury's verdict finding Wal-Mart one
hundred percent at fault for Smith's injuries was acceptable because "Wal-Mart
should have anticipated that.., a reasonable person would take a reasonably
anticipated risk of walking across a wet parking lot and enter[ing] a wet
23
vestibule for the purpose of obtaining the benefit of shopping at the store."'
V. COMMENT
The significance of Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. lies in the court's
application of the Second Restatement of Torts regarding the open and obvious
doctrine. The traditional doctrine needed to be revised so that an obvious
condition would not automatically eliminate liability for landowners; however,

invitee all dangerous conditions which are known to the possessor and are
likely not to be discovered by the invitee; and (3) see that the premises are
safe for the reception of a visitor, or at least ascertain the condition of the
land, to give such warning that the invitee may decide intelligently whether
or not to accept the invitation, or may protect himself against the danger if he
does accept it.
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Harris
v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Mo. 1993)).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l) (1965) (emphasis added).
118. 943 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
119. Smith, 967 S.W.2d at 204.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Id. at 204-05.
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the Eastern District needs to carefully apply the modification so that it does not
in effect abolish the doctrine.
24 was careful in applying the new
The supreme court in Harris1
modification, and in fact found in favor of the defendant after applying it. 125 It
was obvious that the majority wanted to narrowly apply the modification and
avoid extreme speculation about what is foreseeable.126 The court probably
wanted to avoid results similar to those that have occurred in other states that
have applied the Second Restatement approach to open and obvious
the Eastern District failed to observe this in both
conditions. 27 However,
129
128
Hellman and Smith.
In Hellman, the Eastern District logically extended the holding in Harrisin
finding that the grocery store should have anticipated that its customers would
encounter the ice in the parking lot and that injuries might result, because often
times it is impossible to walk on ice without slipping and falling. 30 However,
the court has now extended the application to include customers who slip and

fall in a puddle of water.'

The distinction is that sometimes there is nothing

one can do to protect oneself if forced to walk on ice. However, a careful and
prudent customer should be able to maneuver around a known puddle of water
without slipping and falling. Still, the decision in Smith is consistent with the
supreme court's decision in Harrisbecause Wal-Mart had notice that somebody
else had already slipped and fallen in the vestibule. 32 Therefore, it was
reasonable for Wal-Mart to anticipate that another accident under the same
conditions might happen.
Modification of the open and obvious doctrine leaves invitees little
incentive to take precautions against injury when on someone else's land. The
present case does not hold plaintiffs responsible for using ordinary care in trying
to avoid water puddles and possible injuries. However, without liability in such
a situation, storeowners are allowed to keep a dangerous condition which could
easily be removed simply because the condition is open and obvious. The court
in Smith v. Wal-Mart might have decided that the store was in a better position
than its customers to prevent the accident by cleaning up the puddle. If this was

124. 857 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. 1993).
125. Id. at 227-28; see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 92-94. The dissent, however, would have applied the concept
more broadly and would have held trustees responsible for anticipating certain events.

See supra note 92.
127. See, e.g., Ward v. K-Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 1990). See also supra
notes 101-07.
128. 943 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
129. 967 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
130. Hellman, 943 S.W.2d at 659.
131. Smith, 967 S.W.2d at 204.
132. Id.
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the case, the court should have so stated to avoid broad interpretations of the
Second Restatement by future courts in its jurisdiction.
The modification of the open and obvious rule could also have an effect on
the warning element of premises liability. Traditionally, a landowner only had
a duty to warn invitees of hidden dangers. Some commentators have suggested
that an open and obvious condition serves notice on an invitee and serves the
same purpose as a warning.13 Would Wal-Mart still have been held liable in
Smith if it had put up a sign warning customers of the slippery floor? After all,
Wal-Mart could still anticipate that customers would ignore the warning, just as
they ignore the obvious condition.
The Eastern District's decision in Smith v. Wal-Mart is consistent with
Missouri law after the Harrisdecision. However, the court needs to be cautious
in applying this concept. The court should apply the modification of the open
and obvious rule sparingly, and only if the landowner can actuallyanticipate that
harm may still exist regardless of knowledge by the invitee. The owner of the
premises should not be responsible for every possibly foreseeable event. After
all, he is not an insurer for all invitees who enter his premises.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri held that
an open and obvious condition does not automatically negate a landowner's
liability if the landowner could have anticipated that the invitee would still
encounter the danger. How future courts will apply this rule after Smith v. WalMart remains to be seen. For now, all landowners should act with reasonable
care by removing from their premises all dangers, even those which are known
and obvious to their customers.
ANN K. DiTTMEmR

133. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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